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on measuring the FDI spillovers. We find the aggregation significantly covers up the 
spillovers, which is further exacerbated by the correlation between the foreign 
presence and the explanatory variable at the disaggregate level. However, if the FDI 
at the level of aggregation is proportional to its domestic counterparts, then the 
aggregation does not affect the measurement of spillovers. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of Caves (1974), testing the spillovers of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has become an active area where researchers have tested the FDI 
spillovers from different aspects and in different countries①. Nevertheless the findings 
are far from consensus in that some find positive spillovers, for example Caves (1974), 
Barrios and Strobl (2002), Barrios et al. (2004), Dimelis and Louri (2004), Sinani and 
Meyer (2004), and Branstetter (2005), while others find negative or no spillovers, for 
example Aitken and Harrison (1999), Braconier et al. (2001), and Sadik and Bolbol 
                                                 
① See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), Saggi (2002), Gorg and Greenaway (2004), and Smeets (2008) 
for a survey. 
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(2001). The mixed findings also motivate researchers to explore the reasons, which 
can be summarized from the following two aspects. 
 
First, the nature of FDI spillovers may be indeed heterogeneous such that the 
empirical exercises in different contexts will inevitably obtain different results, which 
is summarized by Smeets (2008) from three aspects, namely the spillover channels, 
mediating factors, and FDI heterogeneity. Three main channels have been identified 
through which the spillovers can occur, that is, the forward and backward linkage 
between FDI invested firms and domestic firms, the movement of employees trained 
by FDI invested firms, and demonstration and competition effects (Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 1998). Mixed findings from the empirical exercises that treat the spillover 
mechanism as a black box may be due to their failure of separating different channels. 
The survey of Smeets (2008) finds that studies that separate spillover channels yield 
more consistent results than those that do not.  Besides, even with a significant level 
of FDI presence, spillovers do not necessarily take place, unless certain necessary 
conditions (mediating factors) are satisfied. For example, domestic firms need to have 
a minimum level of absorptive capacity to benefit from the FDI (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Glass and Saggi, 1998). In addition, the activities 
of FDI invested firms may be heterogeneous such that domestic firms are affected 
differently. For example, shared foreign and domestic ownership is found to present 
better spillovers than that of sole foreign ownership in Romania (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2008).  
 
Second, the methodology and data sets employed may also play a role in finding the 
spillovers. The commonly used method in testing FDI spillovers is to regress a 
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measurement of the performance of domestic industries or firms, for example the 
labor productivity or total factor productivity, against a measurement for the presence 
of FDI, usually called foreign presence, and control for the other factors that have a 
direct effect on the domestic performance, such as the capital intensity and human 
capital. The significance and magnitude of the coefficient of foreign presence is the 
focus of the studies. Thus it is important to choose an appropriate measurement for 
FDI. Conventionally, there are three kinds of measurements for FDI, that is, the share 
of foreign owned firms’ equity in the whole industry, the share of foreign owned 
firms’ employment in the whole industry, and the share of foreign owned firms’ 
production in the whole industry. The equity share may be distorted by host country 
ownership restrictions (Kohpaiboon, 2006), for example the host country may impose 
a restriction that the share of foreign capital in total capital can not be higher than a 
fixed amount in some industries. FDI tends to invest in more capital-intensive 
industries compared with their domestic counterparts, particularly in developing 
countries, and the share of foreign owned firms’ employment in the whole industry 
will be thus lower, so that this measurement will under-represent the presence of FDI 
(Kohpaiboon, 2006). As for the share of output of foreign owned firms in the whole 
industry, it is argued that when the dependent variable is productivity, which usually 
is calculated from the output, it is more appropriate to measure the foreign presence 
by inputs (Caves, 1974). These three measurements may thus distort the true presence 
of FDI. These distortions may contribute to the mixed empirical results, and make the 
estimation results sensitive to the choice of FDI measurement (Gorg and Greenaway, 
2004).  
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Regarding the data sets, either cross-sectional or panel data sets are used in empirical 
studies, and these data sets are either on a disaggregate firm level or on an aggregate 
industry level. Gorg and Stobl (2001) find that studies using cross-sectional data find 
more technology spillovers from FDI than studies using panel data, which is later 
disputed by Lipsey and Sjoholm (2005). Nevertheless, using the panel data set, it is 
easier to control for the endogeneity of FDI. In addition, the cross-sectional data sets 
may not be able to capture all relevant aspects of FDI spillovers due to the dynamic 
nature of the spillovers themselves. The level of aggregation will also play a role in 
measuring the FDI spillovers. As shown by Caballero and Lyons (1989), spillovers at 
a lower level of aggregation may be internalized at a higher level of aggregation. Thus, 
estimations that use firm-level (disaggregate) data will tend to present contrasting 
results with those of industry-level (aggregate) data. In the survey of Gorg and 
Greenaway (2004), 12 papers out of the 40 papers that examine the intraindustry 
productivity spillovers use the aggregate industry level data, of which 2 find no 
significant spillovers. In contrast, 29 papers use the disaggregate data, of which 10 
find positive spillovers, 16 find no significant spillovers, 4 find negative spillovers, 
and 3 papers that deal with multiple countries find some countries have positive 
spillovers while other countries have negative or insignificant spillovers.  
 
This paper intends to address the impact of aggregation on measuring the FDI 
spillovers, using a Monte Carlo experiment approach. We first generalize the 
condition on which the aggregation does not affect measuring the spillovers, and then 
show that, given that the spillovers occur at the disaggregate level, the aggregation 
significantly reduces the probability of detecting the spillovers at the aggregate level. 
We also investigate whether this probability depends on the correlation between the 
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measurement of FDI and the explanatory variable and the way that the measurement 
of FDI is constructed. The findings of this paper not only provide an answer from the 
data aspect to the mixed empirical results, but also present an implication to future 
empirical exercises in detecting the FDI spillovers. The remainder of this paper is 
organized into three sections. Section two provides a conceptual illustration of the 
impact of aggregation. In section three, we deploy the Monte Carlo experiment and 
discuss the results. Section four concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual Illustration 
In studying the role of external economies in the U.S. manufacturing sector, Caballero 
and Lyons (1989) show that the external economies at a lower level of aggregation 
can be internalized at a higher level of aggregation.  We reproduce their result here in 
the context of FDI for the sake of a conceptual illustration. 
 
In an economy where there are I sectors, every sector has J industries, and every 
industry has K firms, the change of firm performance (y) is decomposed into change 
of the presence of FDI (λ ) and change of all other factors (x), namely 
ijkijkijk dbdxdy λ+=  where the subscripts i, j, and k denotes sector, industry, and firm 
respectively, and the presence of FDI is in turn determined by the performance of 
industry ( ijy ), sector ( iy ) and economy ( y )
②, namely dydydyd iijijk 321 βββλ ++=  
where the β ’s  are the ‘externality’ parameters. So at the firm level: 
dydydybdxdy iijijkijk 321 βββ +++=  
                                                 
② Empirical evidences (see the surveys by Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Saggi, 2002; Gorg and 
Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008)  have suggested that FDI tends to flow into high performance 
countries, sectors, and industries, which causes the endogeneity problem in these exercises.  
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Sum over k, we obtain the industry level equation: 
dydydxbdy iijij
1
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1
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1 111 β
β
β
β
β −+−+−=  
where K is normalized to 1. Higher level aggregations can be made similarly, which 
yields: 
dydxbdy ii
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3
21 11 ββ
β
ββ −−+−−=  
dxbdy
3211 βββ −−−=  
where J and I are normalized to 1. Hence, we see that as the level of aggregation 
increases the impact of FDI presence, namely the externality, decreases and 
eventually disappears.  
 
In empirical exercises, researchers often regress a measurement of the performance of 
domestic firms against the foreign presence, controlling for other factors that have a 
direct effect on the performance of domestic firms. Considering this widely used 
empirical approach, we now suppose the foreign presence affects domestic firms in 
the following way:  
ijkijijkijk cbxay ελ +++=        (1) 
where the subscript i denotes the sector and Ii ,,1L= ; the subscript j denotes the 
industry and Jj ,,1L= ; the subscript k denotes the firm and Kk ,,1L= ; y is the 
performance of the domestic firm k in the industry j of sector i, and  in empirical 
exercises y is often the firm productivity; x represents the factors that directly affect y, 
for example in testing the productivity spillovers of FDI x often includes the labor and 
capital; ijλ  denotes the presence of FDI in the industry j of sector i, and 
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Aggregate at the industry level, we obtain: 
ijijijij cKbxaKy ελ +++=        (2) 
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ϕ . So given the true model of equation (2), the following 
equation is used to estimate the spillovers: 
ijiijij cKbxaKy ηλ +++=        (4) 
where ϕεη cKijij −= . Thus in general cases, the estimation of the coefficient cK will 
be biased due to the presence of ϕ . Nevertheless if the FDI at the industry level is 
proportional to its domestic counterparts in every sector, that is,  iijFDIij zz α=,  
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where iα  is the proportion and can vary across sectors and FDIijz ,  and ijz  denote the 
FDI and domestic firms in the industry j of sector i respectively, then the aggregation 
has no effect on measuring the spillovers, as follows: 
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3. The Monte Carlo Experiment 
If the FDI is not proportional to its domestic counterparts at the level of aggregation, 
then whether the spillovers will be detected at the aggregate level depends on ϕ , 
which is a function of z. Hence a guess is that the impact of aggregation will possibly 
depend on the correlation between the presence of FDI at the disaggregate level and 
the explanatory variable x, and the way that the aggregate foreign presence is 
constructed, namely whether z is an exogenous variable or explanatory variable (x) or 
dependent variable (y).  We investigate this hypothesis in the following Monte Carlo 
Experiment. 
 
We look at an economy where there are 10 sectors (I = 10), every sector has 20 
industries (J = 20), and every industry have 45 domestic firms (K = 45). The 
disaggregate foreign presence, ijλ , is generated from a uniform distribution, namely 
( )1,0~ Uijλ . Note that every domestic firm in the same industry is faced with the 
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same level of foreign presence, that is, [ ]Knmijnijm L1, ∈∀= λλ . The explanatory 
variable ijkx  is generated from the following equation: 
( ) 2112
100~
ρλσ
ρλ
−
+=
ij
ijijk xx  
where ( )10,0~~ Ux , ( )ijλσ  is the standard deviation of ijλ , and ρ  is the correlation 
between ijλ  and ijkx , which is set to take three different values (0, 0.2, and 0.8) in the 
experiment.  The domestic firm performance, ijky , is then generated following 
equation (1), where a =1, b = 0.5, and c is set to be 0.8 or -0.8 in different scenarios to 
examine the impact of aggregation when there are positive or negative spillovers at 
the disaggregate level respectively. 
 
Given the data generated at the disaggregate firm level, we first regress the y against x 
and λ , test the significance, and check the sign of the estimated coefficient of λ . 
Then we aggregate them to the industry level. The aggregate foreign presence is 
constructed following equation (3), where z is equal to x, y, or an exogenous uniform 
distribution, depending on which scenario we examine. We again regress the y against 
x and λ , where the robust standard errors are used to accommodate the 
heteroskedasticity due to the aggregation, test the significance, and check the sign of 
the estimated coefficient of λ  at the aggregate level. We then use two indicator 
variables to capture the regression outcomes. One indicator variable (A) takes a value 
of one if the regression at the disaggregate level obtains significant estimate with 
correct sign, and zero otherwise. The other indicator variable (B) takes a value of one 
if both regressions obtain significant estimate with correct sign, and zero otherwise. 
This exercise is repeated 100,000 times, which produces an empirical distribution for 
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these two indicator variables. The conditional probability of detecting significant 
spillovers at the aggregate level given the significant spillovers are detected at the 
disaggregate level is then equal to the mean value of B divided by that of A. 
 
Altogether we examine 18 scenarios, which are categorized from three aspects, 
namely whether there exist positive or negative spillovers at the disaggregate level in 
the data generating process, the three levels of correlation ( ρ ) between the  foreign 
presence and the explanatory variable x at the disaggregate level, and three ways of 
constructing the aggregate foreign presence. Table 1 presents the probability of 
detecting significant spillovers at the aggregate level, conditional on being able to 
detect significant spillovers at the disaggregate level when there exist positive 
spillovers at the disaggregate level in the data generating process. Table 2 presents the 
conditional probability estimate when the spillovers are negative in the data 
generating process.  
 
Three observations can be found from the tables. First, it is evident from both the 
Tables 1 and 2 that the probability of detecting the FDI spillovers at the aggregate 
industry level, conditional on being able to detect the spillovers at the disaggregate 
firm level, is rather low, no matter which scenarios we use.  Hence the aggregation 
indeed can significantly cover up the spillovers.  
 
The second observation is that the correlation between the disaggregate foreign 
presence and the explanatory variable plays an important role in detecting spillovers 
at the aggregate level. For example, in the scenarios where positive spillovers exist at 
the disaggregate level and the aggregate foreign presence is constructed over the 
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explanatory variable x, the conditional probability of detecting significant spillovers at 
the aggregate level decreases nearly five times, from 16.18 per cent when the 
correlation is 0 to 3.36 per cent when the correlation is 0.2. When we continue to 
increase the correlation to 0.8, the conditional probability continues to decrease but at 
a smaller magnitude.  By comparing the conditional probabilities in the scenarios with 
zero correlation and non-zero correlation, we can find that the correlation is 
detrimental to detecting significant spillovers at the aggregate level. There exists a 
significant decrease in the conditional probability when the correlation is increased 
from zero to non-zero. 
 
Third, by comparing the scenarios where the correlation is fixed, we can find that the 
way we construct the aggregate foreign presence appears not to significantly affect the 
conditional probability of finding significant spillovers over the aggregate data. For 
example, when the correlation is zero and there exist positive spillovers at the 
disaggregate level (see Table 1), the conditional probabilities are quite similar across 
the three ways of constructing the aggregate foreign presence (16.18 per cent, 15.59 
per cent, and 16.08 per cent respectively).  
<insert Table 1 here> 
<insert Table 2 here> 
 
4. Conclusion 
The findings can be summarized as four points: (1) the aggregation significantly 
covers up the spillovers; (2) nevertheless, if the FDI at the level of aggregation is 
proportional to its domestic counterparts, then the aggregation does not affect the 
measurement of spillovers; (3) the correlation between the foreign presence and the 
explanatory variable at the disaggregate level exacerbates the covering-up impact of 
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aggregation; (4) fortunately the way we construct the foreign presence appears not to 
significantly affect the impact of aggregation. The implication for future empirical 
exercises in testing the FDI spillovers, or more broadly testing the impact of a 
variable where the variable is constructed from the data set, is that the disaggregate 
data is preferred to the aggregate data. However if the disaggregate data is not 
available and the aggregate data is used instead, the distribution of FDI shall be paid 
attention to. 
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Table 1 Conditional Probability of Detecting 
Spillovers at the Aggregate Level When Positive 
Spillovers Exist at the Disaggregate Level 
  0=ρ   2.0=ρ 8.0=ρ  
Aggregate foreign 
presence constructed 
over:   
 x 0.1618 0.0336 0.0279 
y 0.1559 0.0328 0.0272 
z 0.1608 0.0325 0.0281 
Note: z denotes an exogenous variable. 
Source: Monte Carlo experiment output. 
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Table 2 Conditional Probability of Detecting 
Spillovers at the Aggregate Level When Negative 
Spillovers Exist at the Disaggregate Level 
  0=ρ  2.0=ρ 8.0=ρ  
Aggregate foreign 
presence constructed 
over:   
 x 0.1621 0.0319 0.0271 
y 0.1646 0.033 0.0287 
z 0.1618 0.0316 0.0281 
Note: z denotes an exogenous variable. 
Source: Monte Carlo experiment output. 
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